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T

HE past few years have witnessed a very noticeable growth in
the powers of state governors. Additional responsibilities have
been placed in their hands as the structure of government has
expanded and become increasingly complex. This has meant a
multiplication of subordinate administrative offices for the execution of the increased functions. The powers of the chief executive
to appoint and remove become especially important because they
constitute a significant aspect of his control over state administration. It is desirable that the extent of these powers be known, not
only from the viewpoint of the governor himself but also from that
of the subordinates and of the public. The present study includes
only the governors' constitutional powers, as the inclusion of
statutory provisions, except as they are incidental to those in the
constitutions, would include too much for the scope of an article.
Analogous cases dealing with other executive officers have been
omitted for the same reason.
The doctrine of the separation of powers plays an important
part in determining the extent of the governor's appointing power,
because if the power to appoint can be called an executive function,
his power will be greater, and will be subject to fewer restrictions
*by the legislature, than if it is not so described. There is no
substantial agreement among the courts as to its classification.'
*Professor of Political Science, The Stout Institute, Menomonie,

Wisconsin.
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Some courts hold that the appointing power is executive by
nature.' " This is not necessarily because of the authority to whom
the power has been given. 2 Nor are the courts at all agreed on
whether the nature of the power is in any way controlled by the
kind of duties which the appointee will be called on to perform.
Some courts hold that if the duties to be performed are distinctly
judicial or legislative, the power to appoint is accordingly judicial
or legislative and can be exercised by the body concerned.' Other
courts have held that the power of appointment is executive,
though it may sometimes be necessary to allow other officers to
exercise it in order that the functions of their departments can
be carried out, but when they do, they themselves are performing
4
executive functions because of the nature of the act.
This leads to the question of the power of the legislature to
give to itself the authority to make appointments, when the constitution has given the legislature the power to determine how
appointments shall be made. The answer to this question depends
on the presence or absence of a specific constitutional prohibition
against such appointment, and also on the attitude of the court
towards the nature, of the appointing function. If the constitution is specific on the matter, that settles the question,5 and also
where the courts have held the power of appointment to be inherently executive, there is no doubt about the legislature's inability
to give itself the power.'
There are, of course, many courts which have held that the
power of appointment is not inherently executive. It should be
tion and finance of three members responsible to and removable at will by
the governor, and provides that "Except as herein otherwise provided ...
The term of office or employment of all state employes shall be at the
pleasure of the appointing officer" (secs. 53-5, 53-48). See Young, Reorganiza10
tion of Administrative Branch of Minnesota Government, (1925)
MINNESOTA LAW REViEw

40.

iaState ex inf. Hadley v. Washburn, (1902) 167 Mo. 680, 67 S. W. 592.
2State ex rel. White v. Barker, (1902) 116 Ia. 96, 89 N. W. 204;

Curtis v. Cornish, (1912) 109 Me. 384, 34 Att. 799; State ex rel. Young v.
Brill, (1907) 100 Minn. 499, 111 N. W. 294, 639; Mosley v. Board of
Commr's, (1928)

200 Ind. 515, 165 N. E. 241; State v. Patterson, (1913)

181 Ind. 660, 105 N. E. 228; State ex inf. Hadley v. Washburn, 1902)
167 Mo. 680, 67 S. W. 592; State ex rel. Landis v. Bird, (1935) 120 Fla.
780, 163 So. 248.
3State ex rel. White v. Barker, (1902) 116 Ia. 96, 89 N. W. 204.
4State ex rel. Young v. Brill, (1907)

100 Minn. 499, 111 N. W. 294;

Holliday v. Fields, (1925) 210 Ky. 179, 275 S. W. 642; State v. Pierre,
(1908) 121 La. 465, 46 So. 574.
5State ex rel. Horne v. Holcombe, (1895) 46 Neb. 88, 64 N. W. 437.
6
State ex rel. Jameson v. Denny, (1888) 118 Ind. 382, 21 N. E. 252;
State ex rel. Yancey v. Hyde, (1889) 121 Ind. 20, 22 N. E. 644; Craig v.
O'Rear, (1923) 199 Ky. 553, 251 S.W. 828.

GOVERNORS' CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS

noted that where the duties to be performed by the appointee are
part of, or very closely related to, the functions of one of the
major departments of government, that department can make the
appointment, without the necessity of a decision on tie question
of the nature of the appointing power., This is in accord with
the theory that the power of appointment is not necessarily executive by nature.
A favorite starting point in the argument in support of the
view described in the preceding paragraph is popular sovereignty
and its relation to governmental power. The theory is that all
sovereign power resides in the people, and they, through the constitution which they draw up and adopt, distribute that power as
they wish to have it distributed. Then, the powers which are
generally given to the legislature, arising from the doctrine of
implied residual powers," are pointed out, and the statement is
made that this totality of powers is in the hands of the legislature
unless it has been specifically denied to the legislature. The
result is that the legislature can either confer the appointing
power iwherever it desires, or it can exercise that power itsel fY
The courts that follow this line of reasoning then proceed to
point out that the separation of powers clause does not itself
define in express terms what powers are legislative, executive, or
judicial, and that it is therefore a limitation, not a grant of
powers.10 Nor does the governor receive the appointing power
because the constitution may declare him to be the chief executive
of the- state,1 nor from the constitutional duty to see that the laws
are faithfully enforced. 1 - It is interesting that not all courts
holding that the governor does not obtain his appointing power
from the separation of powers principle are in agreement as to the
'Stateex rel. White v. Barker, (1902) 116 Ia. 96, 89 N. W. 204; Dunbar v. Cronin, (1917) 18 Ariz. 583, 164 Pac. 447.
8State ex rel. v. Compson, (1898) 34 Or. 25, 54 Pac. 349.
9
Sinking Fund Commissioners v. George, (1898) 104 Ky. 260, 47 S. W.
779; State ex rel. Standish v. Boucher, (1893) 3 N. D. 389; 56 N. W.
142; State ex rel. Sherman v. George, (1892) 22 Or. 142, 29 Pac. 356;
Cox v. State, (1904) 72 Ark. 94, 78 S. W. 756.

ORichardson v. Young, (1909) 122"Tenn. 471, 125 S. W. 664; Field v.

The People ex rel. McClernand, (1839) 3 Ill. 79; Sinking Fund Cmmrs.
v. George, (1898) 104, Ky. 260, 47 S. W. 779; State v. Davis, (1910) 88
S. C. 204, 70 S. E. 417.
-Cox v. State, (1904) 72 Ark. 94, 78 S. W. 756; Purnell v. Mann.

(1898) 105 Ky. 87, 48 S. W. 407; Hovey v. State ex rel. Carson, (1889)
119 Ind. 395, 21 N. E. 21; Biggs v. McBride, (1889) 17 Or. 640, 21 Pac.
878; State ex rel. Lyon v. Bowdon, (1912) 92 S. C. 393, 75 S. E. 866;
v. Young, (1909) 122 Tenn. 471, 125 S. V. 664.
Richardson
12Mayor of Baltimore v. State ex rel. the Board of Police of Baltimore,
(1859) 15 Md. 376.
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nature of the power. As we have seen, several courts reject the
idea that it is executive at all. Others hold that while they are
not so sure there is nothing executive in the nature of the power,
it makes no difference, because the executive nature of the power
is not sufficiently pronounced to prevent its being performed
by other branches of government if they are authorized to do so,
and that the separation of powers doctrine is not sufficient to prevent such authorization. 13 Another viewpoint is that the strict
separation of powers doctrine is breaking down, one reason for
which is the difficulty of classifying certain powers, particularly
the appointing power.14
In some instances the power to appoint has been given a designation entirely separate from the categories of executive, legislative, or judicial. For instance, a California court declares that
this power is "political."' 5 And an Oklahoma court gives a simple
explanation, that the fact that a governor ordinarily appoints many
more officers than does any other part of the government does
not indicate that there is anything inherently executive about the
power, but simply shows that the constitution has specifically
lodged the power in this particular place, rather than elsewhere. 1 0
The authorities that have just been discussed go further than
suggesting that there are no affirmative constitutional implications or inferences that the appointing power is inherently executive, and assert that there are negative inferences to be drawn
from other parts of the constitutions, showing an intention that
the appointing power was not meant to be executive or handled
only by the governor. Among such provisions are those enumerating the officers whom the governor can appoint, 7 the specific
constitutional grant of certain appointments to officers other than
the governor,18 and the constitutional grant to state legislatures
' 3 Hovey v. State ex rel. Carson, (1889) 119 Ind. 395, 21 N. E. 21;
Fox v. McDonald, (1892) 101 Ala. 51, 13 So. 416; French v. State ex rel.
Harley, (1895) 141 Ind. 618, 41 N. E. 2; Richardson v. Young, (1909)
122 Tenn. 471, 125 S.W. 664; In re Appointment of Revisor, (1910) 141
Wis. 4592, 124 N. W. 670.
1 Mayor and Council of Americus v. Perry, (1902) 114 Ga. 871, 40
S. E. 1004; Mayor of Baltimore v. State ex rel. of the Board of Police of
Baltimore, (1859) 15 Md. 376.
15 People ex rel. Aylett v. Langdon, (1857) 8 Cal. 1; see also Richardson v. Young, (1909) 122 Tenn. 471, 125 S.W. 664.
16Riley v. State ex rel. McDaniel, (1914) 43 Okla. 65, 141 Pac. 264.
17Fox v. McDonald, (1892) 101 Ala. 51, 13 So. 416; State ex rel.
Standish v. Boucher, (1893) 3 N. D. 389, 56 N. W. 142; Purnell v. Mann,
(1898) 105 Ky. 87, 48 S.W. 407.
iSRoss v. Freeholders of Essex, (1903) 69 N. J.L. 291, 55 At. 310.
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of the power to determine the method of appointment of all or
specific officers.19
In deciding this question of the nature and location of the
appointing power, the courts have made an extensive use of contemporaneous construction."
They have, of course, held that this
evidence is not binding, but state that it is very persuasive, showing that the people have acquiesced in the situation for a period of
years.
The next consideration must concern itself with the question
of the extent of the power of the legislature to restrict the governor in making selections for the offices to which he has the
authority to make appointments, whatever the source of that
authority may be. The general doctrine is that so long as the
restrictions can be classed as qualifications the legislature can prescribe them. 2- Examples of permissible qualifications include the
requirement that a board be composed of five men and four
women ;22 that a state board of control be composed of a member
from each of five separate districts, each of whom must have been
a resident for at least ten years of his district, and no one of whom
could be appointed from a county where one of the state institutions was located ;23 and various requirements concerning party
membership on a board where the legislature was attempting to
provide for a nonpartisan or bipartisan board. "
Where the attempted restriction goes beyond that of mere
qualification, the courts are sharply divided. Where the power
to appoint is by the constitution specifically lodged in the gover' 9 Trustees v. McIver, (1875) 72 N. C. 76; Mayor of Baltimore v.
State ex rel. Board of Police of Baltimore, (1859) 15 Md. 376; Elliott V.
McCrea, (1910) 23 Ida. 524, 130 Pac. 785; Dunbar v. Cronin, (1917) 18
Ariz. 583, 164 Pac. 447; Hovey v. State ex rel. Carson, (1889) 119 Ind.
395, 21 N. E. 21; State ex reL Rosenstock v. Swift, (1876) 11 Nev. 128;
Richardson
v. Young, (1909) 122 Tenn. 471, 125 S. W. 664.
20
Fox v. McDonald, (1892) 101 Ala. 51, 13 So. 416; People ex rel.
Dunham v. Morgan, (1878) 90 Ill. 558; Overshiner v. State. (1900) 156
Ind. 187, 59 N. E. 468; Eddy v. Kincaid, (1895) 28 Or. 537, 41 Pac. 156;
Mayor and Council of Americus v. Perry, (1902) 114 Ga. 871, 40 S. E. 1004.
21State ex rel. Buford v. Daniel, (1924) 87 Fla. 270, 99 So. 804; State
ex rel. Attorney General v. Bryan, (1905) 50 Fla. 293, 39 So. 931; State
ex rel. Harvey v. Wright, (1913) 251 Mo. 325, 158 S. W. 823; Rogers V.
Common Council of Buffalo, (1890) 123 N. Y. 173, 25 N. E. 274.
22
State ex rel. Buford v. Daniel, (1924) 87 Fla. 270, 99 So. 804.
23
State ex rel. Attorney General .. Bryan, (1905) 50 Fla. 293. 39 So.
931. 24
State ex rel. Harvey v. Wright, (1913) 951 Mo. 325, 158 S. W.
823; Rogers v. Common Council of Buffalo, (1890) 123 N. Y. 173, 25
N. E. 274.
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nor, at least two courts have held that a legislative direction that
appointees to certain boards must be selected from a list to be
presented by some outside group (such as a Chiropractors' Association in case of a Chiropractors' Examining Board) is unconstitutional.25 The courts emphasize the fact that if the governor's
choice can be restricted to one out of five, it might also be reduced
to one out of one. Where the constitution provides that the
appointment of officers shall be made in such manner as may be
prescribed by law, the courts which hold that appointment is an
executive power have decided that the legislature cannot make
the appointment itself, nor authorize anyone not connected with
the executive branch of the government to do so."'
Other courts, however, have held that the legislature can place
restrictions on the appointing power of the governor.2 7 This is
especially true in those states whose courts do not regard the
power to appoint as being strictly executive in nature.2 8 And
where the constitution is silent on the subject of appointments and
there is no express provision for separation of powers, but the
court has held that the power of appointment is not inherently
executive, we find that at least one state has allowed the legisla2
ture to make restrictions on the governor's appointing power. 1
As to the strictness of the adherence to restrictions, if the
restriction is not mandatory the governor need not follow itY °
However, if it is mandatory, the courts that have considered the
question have decided that if the governor ignores the restrictions,
the appointments are invalid."
If the restriction is held invalid
and not binding on the governor, but the governor has nevertheless followed it, the appointment is good, unless the invalidity of
the restriction is sufficient to invalidate the whole statute.32 Even
2

Westlake v. Merritt, (1923) 85 Fla. 28, 95 So. 303; State ex rel.
Childs v. Griffen, (1897) 69 Minn. 311, 72 N. W. 117. But compare State
ex rel. Buell v. Frear, (1911) 146 Wis. 291, 131 N. W. 832.
2
6State ex inf. Hadley v. Washburn, (1902) 167 Mo. 680, 67 S. W.
592; State ex rel. Tolerton v. Gordon, (1911) 236 Mo. 142, 139 S. W.
403; Ex Parte Pope, (1925) 33 Okla. Cr. Rep. 5, 242 Pac. 290.
27
1n re Registration of Campbell, a Physician, (1901) 197 Pa. St.
581, 247 AtI. 860; Ingard v. Barker, (1915) 27 Ida. 124, 147 Pac. 293.
sElledge v. Wharton, (1911) 89 S. C. 113, 71 S. E. 657; State ex rel.
Buford v. Daniel, (1924) 87 Fla. 270, 99 So. 804.
29Rosoff v. Haussamen, (1930) 59 N. D. 154, 228 N. W. 830.
3
°Ingard v. Barker, (1915) 27 Ida. 124, 147 Pac. 293.
3
1Elledge v. Wharton, (1911) 89 S. C. 113, 71 S. E. 657; People ex rel.
McDougall
v. O'Toole, (1897) 164 11. 344, 45 N. E. 141.
32
Ex parte Lucas, (1900) 160 Mo. 218, 61 S. W. 218; State ex rel.
Simeral v. Seavey, (1887) 22 Neb. 454, 35 N. W. 228.
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if the appointment is held to be invalid, the acts of the officer
will be upheld as those of a de facto officer, as against anyone but
a rightful claimant of the office.33
Another question concerning the power of the legislature arises
when the constitution gives a blanket appointing power to the
governor if no method of appointment has been "otherwise provided." Where the constitution adds ". . unless a different mode
'
of appointment be prescribed by the law creating the office,"' it
seems clear that the legislature can provide for an appointing
authority other than the governor." Where, however, the words
are".. and whose appointments are not otherwise provided for,"
the courts have decided that inasmuch as the phrase is in the
present tense, it means provided for in the constitution, and that
the legislature cannot itself make other provision.
Related to this question of the power of the legislature to
nlake appointments or to restrict the governor's power, is the
question whether or not the grant of new duties to an already
established office is the creation of a new office or the appointment
of an officer to a new office. The general doctrine is that it is
neither. 37 This is true even if some agency other than the governor is given the power to select from several individuals, all of
whom have been appointed to their original offices by the governor.
This doctrine cannot, however, be used to circumvent the governor's constitutional appointing power by abolishing the office whose
incumbent he had the power to appoint, and giving essentially
the same duties to another officer who is selected in a different
38
manner.
It is well to turn next to a consideration of certain rules
which are based on judicial interpretation. Where the power of
appointment is not specifically in the governor, and an office would
33

Elledge v. Wharton, (1911) 89 S.C. 113, 71 S.E. 657.
34Maryland, constitution, art. II, sec. 10.
35Riggin v. Lankford, (1918) 134 Md. 146, 105 At. 172; See also
Davis v.The State, (1854) 7 Md. 151; Mayor of Baltimore v.State ex rel.
of the Board of Police of Baltimore, (1859) 15 Md. 376; State ex rel.
Simeral v. Seavey, (1887) 22 Neb. 454, 35 N. W. 228.
36People ex rel. Welker v.Bledsoe, (1873) 68 N. C. 457. See also
State ex rel. Clark v. Stanley, (1872) 66 N. C. 59; State ex rel. Howerton
v.Tate, (1873) 68 N. C. 546; People ex rel. Nichols Y. McKee, (1873)
68 N. C. 429.
3
7Cathers v. Hennings, (1906) 76 Neb. 295, 107 N. WV. 586; People
v. Crissman, (1907) 41 Colo. 450, 92 Pac. 949; State v.Coombs. (1851)
32 Me.
3 526; Commonwealth v.Leach, (1923) 246 Mass. 464, 141 N. E. 301.
sState ex rel. Schalk v. Wrightson, (1895) 58 N. J. L. 50, 32 At. 820.
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remain vacant if someone did not make an appointment to fill it,
can the governor take that power? Some courts have answered
this question in the affirmative, implying the power from the governor's position as chief executive, and from the power to see that
the laws are faithfully executed. 9 Other courts have held that
the governor obtains no extra power from these laws, and that
he cannot make an appointment, even though the office may otherwise stand vacant. 40 And even if the constitution specifies that
the legislature shall provide for the election of certain officers, provision can be made for temporary appointment by the governor
until there can be an election.

41

The problem of whether or not the governor had intended to
make an appointment would not seem to present difficulties, but
questions have arisen in several cases. Thus, when the governor
approved a bill by which the legislature made certain appointments, and the court held that the legislature had no power of
appointment, the South Dakota court construed the action of the
governor as an appointment. 2 This construction seems rather
strained. The doctrine of other cases seems to be that if a certain construction of the actions of the governor will give the result
that he accomplishes what he legally has the power to accomplish,
and another construction will mean that his action is invalid and
of no effect, the first construction will be adopted, unless it is too
forced or is very obviously contrary to what the governor
intended.

4

3

One matter on which there has been a large amount of controversy has been vacancies and the power of the governor to
make appointments to fill them. One of the first questions that
arises concerns anticipatory appointments, the power to make an
appointment to fill a vacancy that has not as yet occurred. The
general rule is that such an appointment can be made if the term
39 State ex rel. Collett v. Gorby, (1889) 122 Ind. 17, 23 N. E. 678;
Barrett v. Duff, (1923) 114 Kans. 220, 217 Pac. 918; State ex rel. Fritts
v. Kuhl,
(1889) 51 N. J. L. 191, 17 Atl. 102.
40 Cull v. Wheltle, (1910) 114 Md. 58, 78 Atl. 820; State ex rel.
Attorney General v. Seay, (1876) 64 Mo. 89; In re Filling of Vacancies by
the Governor, (1907) 28 R. I. 602, 67 Atl. 802; Cahill v. Board of State
Auditors, (1901) 127 Mich. 487, 86 N. W. 950.
41State
ex rel. Wichman v. Gerbig, (1933) 55 Nev. 46, 24 P. (2d) 313.
42
Thomas et al v. State, (1904) 17 S. D. 579, 97 N. W. 1011. Sec also
State v. Adams, (1829) 2 Stew. (Ala.) 231; Walsh v. People ex rel.
McClenahan, (1922) 72 Colo. 406, 211 Pac. 646.
43
State ex rel. Worrell v. Peelle, (1889) 121 Ind. 495, 22 N. E. 654;
Stamps v. Tittle, (Tex. Civ. App. 1914) 167 S. W. 776.

GOVERNORS' CONSTITUTIONAL POIVERS

of the appointing power extends beyond the point of time when
the vacancy arises, but not otherwise.
Where the legislature has
set up a new office, some courts have held that the governor can
make an appointment immediately, although the law does not go
into effect immediately.45 At least one court, however, has come
to the opposite conclusion." It should also be noted that in some
states not only are anticipatory appointments allowed, but they
are required.4 7 This is for the purpose of having appointments
made during a legislative session, so as to avoid the necessity of
recess appointments. But the general rule that an appointing
governor cannot tie the hands of his successor by making anticipatory appointments, has an exception where the successor is the
lieutenant governor, for in that case the latter is simply performing
the functions of the governor, and is not enjoying a new term of
his own.

48

If the appointment can be made, the question of the time of
eligibility of the candidate then arises. This is a common question
of constitutional law, and the pronounced split of opinion has
received full discussion elsewhere.4 9 In the main case involving
the powers of a governor, the court decided that if the individual
were qualified at the time he took the office, that would be sufficient.50

Another kind of vacancy which might arise comes from the
creation of a new office. Even though the new office never has
been filled, the majority opinion seems to be that there is a
vacancy, which the governor can fill." The opposite opinion holds
44

(1856)

Pattangall v. Gilman, (1916) 115 Me. 344, 98 Atl. 936; Ivy v. Lusk,
11 La. Ann. 486; Oberhaus v. State ex rel. McNamara, (1911) 173

Ala. 483, 55 So. 898; State ex rel. Taylor v. Cowen, (1917) 96 Ohio St.

277, 117 N. E. 238.
45People ex rel. Graham v. Inglis, (1896) 161 I1. 256, 43 N. E. 1103;
State ex rel. Clarke v. Irwin, (1869) 5 Nev. 111; Ross v. Jones, (1921)
151 Ga. 425, 107 S. E. 160.
"16State
ex rel. Wolcott v. Kuhns, (1913) 4 Boyce (Del.) 416, 89 At!. 1.
47
Brady v. Howe, (1874) 50 Miss. 607.
4
sState ex rel. Nagle v. Stafford, (1934) 97 Mont. 275, 34 P. (2d) 372.
4946
C. J. 938.
5
oState ex rel. West v. Breckinridge, (1912) 34 Okla. 649, 126 Pac. 806.
51State ex rel. Wood v. Cotham, (1914) 116 Ark. 36, 172 S. W. 260;
People ex rel. Barbour v. Mott, (1851) 3 Cal. 502; People ex rel. Tucker
v. Rucker, (1880) 5 Colo. 455; Gormley v. Taylor, (1871) 44 Ga. 76;
Knight v. Trigg, (1909) 16 Ida. 256, 100 Pac. 1060; State ex rel. Dreibelbiss
v. Berghoff, (1901) 158 Ind. 349, 63 N. E. 717; Schnaffner v. Shaw,
(1921) 191 Iowa 1047, 180 N. W. 853; State v. Holcomb, (1910) 83 Kan.
256, 111 Pac. 188; Yates v. McDonald, (1906) 123 Ky. 596, 96 S. W. 865;
State ex rel. Henderson v. County Court of Boone County, (1872) 50 Mo.
317; Patterson v. Lentz, (1914) 50 Mont. 322, 146 Pac. 932; State ex rel.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

that where there has never been an occupant there cannot be a
vacancy.52 The governor has the appointing power even though
the state constitution gives it to him only when an office shall
"become vacant," and the office has never been occupied,"a and
also though the legislature obviously set the time for an act to
take effect two days after a general election, with the result that

54
the governor appoints to an otherwise elective office.

Occasionally a vacancy will occur because the appointing power,
other than the governor, has failed to act. In general, the occurrence of this situation does not of itself give to the governor the
power to make the appointment, and he does not have it unless
authority for it can be found elsewhere.55 This is especially true
where the vacancy arises because it is unconstitutional for an
officer designated in a statute to act ex officio, though the governor was allowed to make the appointment where the main office
was abolished, but the ex officio office was not abolished.60
Where the legislature has given itself the power to make a
certain appointment, and has given to the governor the power to
fill vacancies, he can make an appointment when the legislature
adjourns without having done so. 7 But if the legislature has
given the power of appointment to some other body in case it fails
to make the appointment, the governor cannot appoint if the legislature adjourns without acting, for the power to make the appointment is "vested elsewhere." ' s Where the question of the time of
the occurrence of the vacancy is important, there is a split of
authority, the Indiana court holding that if the vacancy existed
during the legislative session and that group did not appoint, the
vacancy did not "occur" during a legislative recess, and therefore the governor could not appoint.5 5 The New Hampshire court
has held the opposite." °
West v. Breckinridge, (1912) 34 Okla. 649, 126 Pac. 806; People ex rel.
Snyder v. Hylan, (1914) 212 N. Y. 236, 106 N. E. 89; Walsh v. Commonwealth ex rel. Evans, (1879) 89 Pa. St. 419.
52State ex rel. Attorney General v. Messmore, (1861) 14 Wis. 177;
People ex rel. Ewing v. Forquer, (1825) Breese (I11.) 104; Ewart v. Jones,
(1895) 116 N. C. 570, 21 S.E. 787.
53
Gormley v. Taylor, (1871) 44 Ga. 76.
54State ex rel. Dreibelbiss v. Berghoff, (1901) 158 Ind. 349, 63 N. E.
717.
55People
ex rel. Simmons v. Sanderson, (1866) 30 Cal. 160.
56
Quigg v. Evans, (1898) 121 Cal. 546, 53 Pac. 1093.
57
People ex rel. Aylett v. Langdon, (1857) 8 Cal. 1.
5sPeople ex rel. Shoaff v. Parker, (1869) 37 Cal. 639.
59Collins
v. The State ex rel. Morrison, (1856) 8 Ind. 344.
60 0pinion of the Justices, (1864) 45 N. H. 590.
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The effect of a constitutional provision that an incumbent shall
hold office until the selection and qualification of a successor affects
the situation under discussion. There is a wide split of authority
on the main question whether there is a vacancy at the end of a
term when there is a holdover provision, and no one has been
selected to fill the office. Upholding the affirmative proposition
that there is no vacancy because there is someone actually in the
office, we find the states of California, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas,
Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, New Me-xico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Utah and Wyoming. " In the opposing group, holding that there is a vacancy which the governor can fill, even though
the holdover is still in office, there are the states of Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Missouri and Texas. 62 There is some doubt as to the proper place
to put Mississippi, for there have been decisions on both sides,"'
but the latest pronouncement of its court seems to place it in the
second group. 64 Missouri, likewise, has decisions on both sides of
the question, 65 but this is because of the question as to who has
the power to make the subsequent appointment.
This question as to the nature and location of the appointing
6

'People ex rel. Parsons v. Edwards, (1892) 93 Cal. 153, 28 Pac. 831;
State ex rel. Carson v. Harrison, (1887) 113 Ind. 434, 16 N. E. 384; Ash
v. McVey, (1897) 85 Md. 119, 36 At. 440; People ex rel. Andrews v. Lord,
(1861) 9 Mich. 227; Lawrence v. Hanley, (1891) 84 Mich. 399, 47 N. W.
753; Shackelford v. West, (1912) 138 Ga. 159, 74 S. E. 1030; Borton v.
Buck, (1871) 8 Kan. 207; State ex rel. Stelsing v. Davis, (1883) 45 N. J. L
390; Klock v. Mann, (1911) 16 N. M. 744, 120 Pac. 313; State ex rel.
Nagle v. Stafford, (1934) 97 Mont. 275, 34 P. (2d) 372; State ex rel. Holt
v. Bristol, (1898) 122 N. C. 245, 30 S. E. 1; State ex rel. v. Howe, (1874)
25 Ohio St. 588; State ex rel. Wagner v. Compson, (1898) 34 Or. 25, 54
Pac. 349; Broom v. Hanley, (1848) 9 Pa. St. 513; Lyon v. Bowdon, (1912)
92 S. C. 393, 75 S. E. 866; Conger v. Roy, (1924) 151 Tenn. 30, 267 S. AV.
122; State ex rel. Stain v. Christensen, (1934) 84 Utah 185, 35 P. (2d)
775; Richardson v. Henderson, (1893) 4 Wyo. 535, 35 Pac. 517.
62
Walsh v. People, ex rel. McClenahan, (1922) 72 Colo. 406, 211 Pac.
646; State ex rel. Eberle v. Clark, (1913) 87 Conn. 537, 89 At. 172; State
ex rel. Landis v. Bird, (1935) 120 Fla. 780, 163 So. 248; Bell v. Sampson,
(1930) 232 Ky. 376, 23 S. W. (2d) 575; State v. Young, (1915) 137 La.
102, 68 So. 241; State ex rel. Smallwood v. Windom, (1915) 131 Minn.
401, 155 N. W. 629; State ex rel. Hairston v. Baggett, (1926) 145 Miss.
142, 110 So. 240; State ex rel. Withers v. Stonestreet, (1889) 99 Mo. 361,
12 S. W. 895; Denison v. State, (1933) 122 Tex. 459, 61 S. W. (2d) 1017.
63
State ex rel. Booze v. Cresswell, (1918) 117 Miss. 795, 78 So. 770;
State v. Hays, (1907) 91 Miss. 755, 45 So. 728; State ex rel. Hairston v.
(1926) 145 Miss. 142, 110 So. 240.
Baggett,
64
State ex rel. Hairston v. Baggett, (1926) 145 Miss. 142, 110 So. 240.
65
State ex rel. Tredway v. Lusk, (1853) 18 Mo. 333; State ex rel.
Withers v. Stonestreet, (1889) 99 Mo. 361, 12 S. W. 895.
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power is, I believe, the key to the whole situation. Those courts
which hold that the governor cannot make the appointment state
that the appointment must be made by the power who has the
authority to make the original appointment, the governor and
senate, the legislature, or some other individual or body, as the
case may be. Those on the opposite side hold that it does not
make any difference who this appointing power may be because
there is a vacancy, and the governor has the power to fill vacancies.
On the decision as to these two related points rests the whole difference of opinion that has been expressed. If there is no general or specific holdover provision that applies to a certain office,
the weight of authority is that none will be implied, and that the
governor can therefore make an appointment."0
There are other types of clauses which provide for the execution of the duties in case of incapacity of the incumbent. The
designation by law of some other officer to perform the functions
does not prevent an appointment by the governor',67 but if the law
designates some other person to make the appointment, there is a
split of authority on the question whether the governor can appoint
under his general power to fill vacancies.0 8 There is substantial
agreement on the doctrine that in the face of a constitutional provision giving to the governor the power to fill vacancies the legislature can make a provision for filling the office temporarily."9
Where time limits have been placed on the governor's power
to appoint, as, for-instance, where a vacancy is to be filled at the
next general election unless it occurs within two months previous
to the election, and where the question involved has been at all
complex, it is noticeable that the decisions have tended to restrict
the governor's power within as narrow limits as possible, and to
give to the people the power of election at the earliest possible
opportunity."0
GGCommonwealth ex rel. v. Sheatz, (1910) 228 Pa. St. 301, 77 Atd.
547; State ex rel. Wood v. Sheldon, (1896) 8 S. D. 525. 67 N. W. 613;
State ex rel. Lavin v. Bacon, (1901) 14 S. D. 284, 85 N. W. 225.
07
People ex rel. Henderson v. Snedecker, (1856) 14 N. Y. 52.
GsState ex rel. Sanders v. Blakemore, (1891) 104 Mo. 340, 15 S. W.
960; State ex rel. Fritts v. Kuhl, (1889) 51 N. J. L. 191, 17 Atl. 102;
King 9v. State, (1901) 43 Fla. 211, 81 So. 254.
670State v. Monk, (1842) 3 Ala. 415.
McCreary v. Williams, (1913) 153 Ky. 49, 154 S. W. 417; People
ex rel. Hart v. Goodrich, (1904) 92 App. Div. 445, 87 N. Y. S. 117; State
ex rel. Baxter v. Brown, (1876) 22 Minn. 482; State ex rel. Satterthwaite v.
Highfield, (1930) 4 Harr. (Del.) 272, 152 At. 45; Commonwealth ex rel.
King v. King, (1877) 85 Pa. St. 103.
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The power of the governor to m ake an appointment when the
elected person dies before he has qualified depends on the presence or absence of a holdover provision and of an individual in
the office. There is no differentiation in results based on whether
the incumbent is reelected or someone else is elected for the new
term. If there is a holdover provision the majority opinion is
that there is no vacancy to which the governor can appoint, 71 even
though the deceased is the reelected incumbent and the actual
appointment is only for the remaining few weeks of the old term.1If there is no such provision, or if the court decides that the
holdover provision shall not be thus interpreted, the governor can
73

make an appointment.

The .effect of a resignation is important. For a resignation to
become effective, it must be accepted by the officer having the
power to fill the vacancy which it will cause. Until then it can be
withdrawn, and it can be withdrawn afterwards if the accepting
officer'gives permission, and rights of third parties have not intervened.74 After the resignation has been accepted there is a vacancy,
and a holdover provision will not apply.7
Besides the causes of vacancies which have been discussed there
are many minor ones which can only be mentioned. Among these
are the failure of the senate to act on nominations sent in by the
governor 76 the.holding of two incompatible offices by one individual 7 7 and a tie vote and an election contest.78 Courts have
held that no vacancies result because of mental or physical disability 79 or absence of the incumbent.8 0

Another question of significance concerns the term of office of
the governor's appointee. WVhere a vacancy has been filled, the
constitution may specify the length of the term, but if it does not
do so one court has decided that the term of the appointee should
7'ln
re Supreme Court Vacancy, (1894) 4 S. D. 532, 57 N. W. 495.
72
Townsley v. Hartfield, (1914) 113 Ark. 253, 168 S. W. 140; State,
on Complaint
of Ryan v. Roden, (1935) 219 Wis. 132, 262 N. W. 629.
7
SPeople ex rel. Mattison v. Nye, (1908) 9 Cal. App. 148, 98 Pac.
241; 7 In the matter of Hamlin, (1921) 196 App. Div. 714, 188 N. Y. S. 326.
4Biddle v. Willard, (1857) 10 Ind. 62; State Px rel. Van Buskirk v.
Boecker, (1874) 56 Mo. 17.
7SCragin
v. Frohmiller, (1934) 43 Ariz. 251, 30 P. (2d) 247.
76
Be1l v. Sampson, (1930) 232 Ky. 376, 23 S. W. (2d) 575; State ex
rel. Robert
v. Murphy, (1893) 32 Fla. 138, 13 So. 705.
77
Truitt v, Collins, (1914) 122 Mkid. 526, 89 Atl. 850.
7
sState v. Adams, (1829) 2 Stew. (Ala.) 231.
79
Huth's Case, (1895) 4 Dist. Rep. (Pa.) 233; In re Advisory Opinion
to Governor, (1914) 67 Fla. 423, 65 So. 4.
sOHolman v. Lutz, (1930) 132 Or. 185, 284 Pac. 825.
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continue only until such time as the office could be filled in the
regular way, either by the legislature or by the people,8 while
another court arrived at the conclusion that it should be for the
2
balance of the unexpired term.1
When the term of an office is specified, but there is no designation of the time when it shall commence, at least one court has
held that the governor's appointee shall serve for a full term.
no matter when he is appointed.83 This is rectified in most states
by the setting of a date when all terms shall commence. When
the provision is that the governor shall appoint a person to hold
until the next general election, the courts have held that the latter's term expires when the election occurs, and not when the
term of others elected at that time would regularly begin. 84 But
when is "the next election?" That depends partly on how the
phrase is worded in the constitution and partly on its interpretation. Various decisions have selected the very next election,8 5 or
the next election at which that particular type of officer would
ordinarily be elected.8 6 Where the phrase is "the next general
election," there is a similar split of authority,8 as is likewise the
case where the phrase is "the next regular election." 88 There are,
of course, several constitutions in which the term of the appointee
is so explicitly defined that there is no room for interpretation.
The general rule would seem to be that if the constitution is not
explicit, the tenure of the appointee will not be for the balance
of the unexpired term if the whole constitution indicates an intention that the appointing power of the governor shall be restricted,
and that the people shall fill the offices whenever it is practicable.
The term of an appointee where the statutory term is uncon8t
1State ex rel. Custer v. Schortemeier, (1925) 197 Ind. 507, 151 N. E.
407; See also State ex rel. Sullivan v. Moore, (Ariz. 1937) 64 P. (2d)

809.

6832State ex rel. Holmes v. Finnerud, (1895) 7 S.D. 237, 64 N. W. 121.
Clark v. State ex rel. Graves, (1912) 177 Ala. 188, 59 So. 259:

See also McDowell v. Burnett, (1912) 92 S. C. 469, 75 S.E. 873.
S4State ex rel. Cosgrove v. Perkins, (1897) 139 Mo. 106, 40 S.W. 650:

State85ex rel. Linn v. Millett. (1898) 20 Wash. 221, 54 Pac. 1124.
State ex rel. Weeks v. Gamble, (1870) 13 Fla. 9; People ex rel
Barbour
v. Mott, (1851) 3 Cal. 502.
6
6 People ex rel. Lynch v. Budd, (1896)
87

114 Cal. 168, 45 Pac. 1060.

State ex rel. Patterson v. Lentz, (1914) 50 Mont. 322, 146 Pac.
932; Baker v. Payne, (1892) 22 Or. 335, 29 Pac. 787; State ex rel. Evard
v. Roach, (1916) 269 Mo. 500, 192 S. W. 745; In re Supreme Court
Vacancy, (1894) 4 S. D. 532, 57 N. W. 495; State ex rel. Halbach v.
Clausen,
(1933) 216 Iowa 1079, 250 N. W. 195.
88
State ex rel. Attorney General v. Conrades, (1869) 45 Mo. 45:
Wendorff v. Dill, (1911) 83 Kan. 782, 112 Pac. 588; State v. Holcomb.
(1910) 83 Kan. 256, 111 Pac. 188.
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stitutional is important. The appointment itself may be good,"2
and under certain circumstances the appointee will hold at the
pleasure of the governor.90 Other courts have held the whole
statute unconstitutional. 91 Where the situation is that the governor has appointed for a period longer than that authorized by the
constitution, the courts have not held the whole appointment void,
but have allowed the appointee to hold for the maximum term
allowed by the constitution. 92
The relations of the governor to the senate are a significant
phase of his appointing power. What can the governor do after
he has made an appointment and before the senate has acted upon
it? If his action is considered merely a nomination, the governor
can withdraw it at will, but if it is considered as an appointment,
it is complete and irrevocable, subject only to favorable action by
the senate. 93 If the appointment is a recess appointment to fill
a vacancy, the power of the governor to revoke it will depend on
the court's interpretation of the constitutional provision involved,
the governor having been given full power under one,"' and no
power at all under another."' The effect of the ending of the
governor's term is not to vest his successor with any more power
than he himself had, but to give -the successor the same power as
his predecessor.96
Another relationship of the governor to the senate is the requirement of senatorial approval of the governor's appointments. In
at least one state this is held to involve a two-thirds majority,
though this is because of the wording of the particular constitutional provision involved. 97 Where the constitution empowers the
governor to appoint, by and with the consent of the senate, all
officers established by the constitution or by law and whose appoint89

People v. Burch, (1891) 84 Mich. 408, 47 N. V. 765.
9OPeople ex rel. Davidson v. Perry, (1889) 79 Cal. 105, 21 Pac. 423;
Lewis v. Lewelling, (1894) 53 Kan. 201, 36 Pac. 351.
9'State
ex rel. Davis v. Botts, (1931) 101 Fla. 361, 134 So. 219.
92Cobb v. Hammock, (1907) 82 Ark. 584, 102 S. W. 382; Walsh v.
People ex rel. McClenahan, (1922) 72 Colo. 406, 211 Pac. 646.
93Barrett v. Duff, (1923) 114 Kan. 220, 217 Pac. 918; State ex rel.
Griffith v. Matassarin, (1923) 114 .Kan. 244, 217 Pac. 930; NicChesney
v. Sampson, (1930) 232 Ky. 395, 23 S. WV.(2d) 584; People ex rel.
Ryder v. Mizner, (1857) 7 Cal. 519.
94State ex rel. Meyer v. Van Tromp, (1875) 27 La. Ann. 569.
95
Barrett v. Duff, (1923) 114 Kan. 220, 217 Pac. 918; People ex rel.
Wetherbee v. Cazneau, (1862) 20 Cal. 504.
96Barrett v. Duff, (1923) 114 Kan. 220, 217 Pac. 918; State ex rel.
Griffith v. Matassarin, (1923) 114 Kan. 244, 217 Pac. 930.
97Denison v. State, (1933) 122 Tex. 459, 61 S. W. (2d) 1017.
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ment or election is not otherwise provided for, the courts have held
that in creating an office the legislature can empower the governor
to fill it without senatorial consent." At least one state has held
that the intent of the legislature to give the governor this power

must be very explicitly shown."

Appointments to fill vacancies

for unexpired terms very seldom require confirmation.' 0 0

This

same rule is applied where a statute creating a new office required
senatorial confirmation of the governor's appointment, but he signs
the bill after the legislature has adjourned,' 0 ' though there is
some authority contra. 0 2
The necessity of senatorial confirmation has been considered,
and the general rule seems to be that when the constitutional term
is until the end of the next legislative session no confirmation is
necessary, but if the appointment is sent to the senate and con-

firmed, it acts as an appointment to fill the vacancy for as long
a term as the law allows.1° 3 When the governor makes an appointment, but fails to notify the senate, the decisions are unanimous
that the senate can consider the names without official notification.10

4

Another angle of the senate's function is its power to make
confirmations during special sessions.

The courts which have con-

sidered this question have all agreed that the limitation on the legislature to consider in special session only those things for which
it was called does not include the confirmation of appointments."'"
9SIn re Question Propounded by the Governor, (1888) 12 Colo. 399,
21 Pac. 488; In re Inman, (1902) 8 Ida. 398, 69 Pac. 120; Holstein v.
Guss, (1918) 143 La. 6, 78 So. 131; Ash v. McVey, (1897) 85 Md. 119.
36 At. 440; State ex rel. Simeral v. Seavey, (1887) 22 Neb. 454, 35
N. W. 228.
9"Sewell and Allington v. Bennett and Levi, (1920) 187 Ky. 626, 220
S. W. 517; Bell v. Sampson, (1930) 232 Ky. 376, 23 S. W. (2d) 575.
"'"State ex rel. West v. France, (1913) 38 Okla. 446, 134 Pac. 403;
State Prison of N. C. v. Day, (1899) 124 N. C. 362, 32 S. E. 748; State
ex rel. Holmes v. Finnerud, (1895) 7 S. D. 237, 64 N. W. 121; State ex rel.
v. Manson, (1900) 105 Tenn. 232, 58 S. W. 319; State ex rel. Brandon v.
Board of Control, (1919) 84 W. Va. 417, 100 S. E. 215.
"'People ex rel. v. Scott, (1911) 52 Colo. 59, 120 Pac. 126; People
v. Hasbrouck, (1895) 11 Utah 291, 39 Pa. St. 918; Merrill v. Commissioners
of Garrett County, (1889) 70 Md. 269, 16 Atl. 723.
"o2O'Leary
v. Adler, (1875) 51 Miss. 28.
1o3 People ex rel. Wetherbee v. Cazneau, (1862) 20 Cal. 504; State v.
Powell, (1888) 40 La. Ann. 241, 4 So. 447; Commonwealth v. Waller,
(1892) 4 145 Pa. St. 235, 23 Ati. 382.
1OBarrett v. Duff, (1923) 114 Kan. 220, 217 Pac. 918; Bell v. Sampson,
(1930) 232 Ky. 376, 23 S. W. (2d) 575; State ex rel. Kriebs v. Halladay,
(1928) 52 S. D. 497, 219 N. W. 497; People v. Showver, (1923) 30 Wyo.
366, 222
0 5 Pac. 11.
People ex rel. Knight v. Blanding, (1883) 63 Cal. 333; State v.
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There is, however, a split of authority on the question whether
appointments mucst be confirmed at special sessions, based on differing interpretations of such constitutional phrases as "at the next
After a confirmaensuing session," or "at the next session."'
tion has once been completed it cannot be withdrawn, but it must
be certain that the confirmation is really complete, for under its
power to adopt its own rules a state senate can provide the power
to reconsider a vote on confirmation within a certain number of
days after the confirmation has been made. 0 7 And if the senate
fails to take any action on the appointment the governor cannot
make an appointment unless the courts hold that a vacancy results
which the governor can fill under his general appointing power.109
There are several decisions concerning the power of the governor to make a recess appointment when he could have filled an
office during the senatorial session, but failed to do so. Where
the only provision is one requiring confirmation if the appointment is made during the legislative session, the governor can make
recess appointments. 0 9 Where, however, the governor's power is
to fill vacancies where there is no method provided in the constitution or statutes, the governor cannot make a recess appointment
if he could have appointed during the senate session. 110 Where
a holdover provision precludes the presence of a vacancy, the governor cannot appoint."" In some states the decision depends on
the interpretation of the words "happen" or "occur," as when the
vacancy happens or occurs during the session of the legislature.
We find here a flat split of authority, some courts holding that
these terms mean to "begin," or to "commence," 112 while other
courts hold that they mean "shall chance to exist," or "shall hapDowling, (1929) 167 La. 907, 120 So. 593; State ex inf. Major ex rel.
Sikes v. Williams, (1909) 222 Mo. 268, 121 S. XV. 64; Advisory Opinion to
the Governor, (1912) 64 Fla. 16, 59 So. 782; State v. Williams, (1883)
20 S. C. 12.
0
64 Fla. 16, 59 So. 782;
. 6Advisory Opinion to the Governor, (1912)
State v. Dowling, (1929) 167 La. 907; 120 So. 593; State v. Irion, (1929)
169 La. 482, 125 So. 567; People ex rel v. Scott, (1911) 52 Colo. 59,
120 Pac. 126.
1ODust v. Oakman, (1901) 126 Mich. 617, 86 N. NV. 151; Witherspoon v. State ex rel. West, (1925) 138 Miss. 310, 103 So. 134.
1osWatkins v. Watkins, (1852) 2 Md. 341; State e-x rel. Robert v.
Murphy, (1893) 32 Fla. 138, 13 So. 705; Bell v. Sampson, (1930) 232 Ky.
S. W. (2d) 575.
376, 23
' 090 Stamps v. Tittle, (Tex. Civ. App. 1914) 167 S. W. 776.
"1 People ex re, Wetherbee v. Cazneau, (1862) 20 Cal. 504.
"'State ex rel. Lyon v. Bowdon, (1912) 92 S. C. 393, 75 S. E. 866.
"'2Murphy v. People ex rel. Lehman, (1925) 78 Colo. 276, 242 Pac.
57; Collins v. The State ex rel. Morrison, (1856) 8 Ind. 344.
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pen to be."'113 In the latter case, of course, the mere existence of
a vacancy during the senate recess will empower the governor to
make an appointment, no matter when the vacancy may originally
have commenced.
Sometimes the senate rejects the governor's nominee, and in
seven state constitutions there is an absolute prohibition against
the governor subsequently appointing the same person for a recess
appointment. Where there is no restriction, at least one court
held that none will be implied." 4 Even when the governor has
made a nomination and the senate has confirmed it, the discretionary power of the governor is not exhausted, for the appointment is not complete until the governor has issued the commission, and he may refuse to do this if he so desires. 115 This doctrine may, however, be different where the original constitutional
provision is different. In fact, one court states that a commission is merely evidence of appointment or election, that the direction to the governor to issue it is mandatory, and that the failure
or refusal to issue it does not affect the right of the officer to
discharge his duties.""
Thus far we have been considering only state officers, but the
relationship of the governor to the appointment of local officers
is also important. The main question is whether local officers are
included in the general constitutional provision concerning appointments. The usual principle is that the general grant of power
applies only to state offices, and does not include vacancies in
city, township, school district, or county offices.117
We have already seen that if the senate refuses to perform its
part in the appointment procedure it cannot be compelled to do so.
Is the same thing true of the governor? An apparent split of
authority can be reconciled by stating that if the duty to appoint
is both mandatory and exclusive, a mandamus will issue against
"13Opinion of the Justices, (1864) 45 N. H. 590; State ex rel. Fritts
v. Kuhl, (1889) 51 N. J. L. 191, 17 Atl. 102.
114Commonwealth ex rel. Lafean v. Snyder, (1918) 261 Pa. St. 57, 104
Atd. 494.
115Lane v. Commonwealth ex rel. Attorney General, (1883) 103 Pa.
St. 481; Harrington v. Pardee, (1905) 1 Cal. App. 278, 82 Pac. 83.
6
11
State ex rel. Coleman v. Lewis, (1936) 181 S. C. 10, 186 S. E. 625.
l17Hogins v. Bullock, (1909) 92 Ark. 67, 121 S. W. 1064; People ex rel.
Dunham v. Morgan, (1878) 90 II. 558; People ex rel. Grinnell v. Hoffman,
(1886) 116 Il. 587, 8 N. E. 788; People ex rel. Hinton v. Hammond, (1885)
66 Cal. 654, 6 Pac. 741; State ex rel. Gleason v. Gerdink, (1909) 173 Ind.
245. 90 N. E. 70.
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the governor,11 but if it is not mandatory a mandamus will not
issue."' 9
An incidental question concerns the methods or legal actions
by which the various questions already discussed can be raised.
If the only question to be decided is that of title to the office,
mandamus will not issue." 9 But if the person seeking the writ
shows prima fade evidence of title in himself, and he seeks to
oust an intruder, the court will protect the prima facie right by
issuing the writ, but without deciding the question of title. 20
The court will, however, receive evidences of title to an office
in a mandamus proceeding, in order to determine whether or not
a prima facie showing of title has been made out. "! An injunction can be issued to prevent an ouster, without actually deciding
the question of title, though the courts have also said that because
there was only one code action they would go ahead and decide
the title so as to settle all questions at once.12 2 If there is a sharp
distinction made between actions at law and suits in equity, the
question of title cannot be decided by any method other than an
action of quo warranto.
So closely allied to the appointing power is the power of
removal, that many courts discuss both of them at the same time.
They seem complementary, and have so many points in common
that a study of one of them should include a study of the other.
Hence, the removal power of the governor will now be considered.
Despite the fact that in some cases the power has been given
to the governor, there are ways in which the legislature can, in
effect, exercise it. One of these is to fail to make appropriations.
Another is by abolishing the office, which it can do unless it is
restrained by some provision of the constitution itself.' 23 It is
llsState ex rel. Trauger v. Nash, (1902) 66 Ohio St. 612. 64 N. E. 558.
"-99 Allen v. Byrd, (1928) 151 Va. 21, 144 S. E. 469.
" aaAs to the extension of mandamus beyond its common law limitations under the Minnesota Veterans' Preference Law. Mason's 1927 Minn.

Stat., secs. 4368-4369, see Jennings, Removal from Public Office in Min-

nesota,0 (1936) 20 MINNEsoTA LAw Rm w 721, 747-748, note 116.
12People ex rel. Ewing v. Forquer, (1825) Breese (Iil.) 104; State

ex rel. Vail v. Draper, (1871) 48 Mo. 213; Conklin v. Cunningham, (1894)
7 N. Mex. 445, 38 Pac. 170; Maramillo v. State ex rel. County Commrs..
(1926) 32 N. M. 20, 250 Pac. 729; Lawrence v. Hanley, (1891) 84 Mich.
399, 47 N. W. 753.
21Cameron v. Parker, (1894) 2 Okla. 277, 38 Pac. 14.
22Ekern v. McGovern, (1913) 154 Wis. 157, 142 N. W. 595. See also
Jennings, Removal from Public Office in Minnesota, (1936) 20 MINVJESoTA
LAW REviEw Y21, 734 (note 60), 825.
"'-Lloyd v. Silver Bow County, (1891) 11 Mont. 408, 28 Pac. 453;
State ex rel. Kenny v. Hudspeth, (1896) 59 N. J. L. 320. 36 Atli. 662;
McGefiee v: State ex rel. Tate, (1917) 199 Ala. 287, 74 So. 374.
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impossible for the legislature to abolish that which is specifically
established by the constitution, but it can make provisions as to
matters (such as duties, filing of bonds, etc.) not included in the
constitutional provision, although the result may be the removal
from office of an incumbent who has been legally selected.' 2' In
those state where the courts hold that an incumbent has a property right or a contract right, the legislature cannot abolish the
office as long as it contains an incumbent.1" 2
The question of obtaining consent of some other body is often
involved in removals. Very few states now employ executive
councils, but where they are employed, a court has at one time
required council consent, 12 but has subsequently changed its decision, due to a constitutional amendment. 1 27 Where the removal
power has been given to the governor with no mention of the
senate, at least one court has held that senate consent is not necessary.128 Where the constitutional provision is that an officer shall
be removed by the power which appointed him, there is a split
of authority, some courts holding that this would necessarily
include the senate, 129 while others hold that consent is not part
of the appointing power and is therefore not necessary for
removal.12 0 Pennsylvania has also announced the artificial doctrine that the appointing power (and therefore that of removal)
belongs to that branch of government whose functions those of
the office in dispute most closely resemble. If they are legislative in character, then the legislature can decide the method of
removal, and can prescribe senate consent. 1'
Another subject discussed by the courts is the nature of the
causes for removal. As a preliminary it should be noticed that
an officer could be removed even if the cause arose while he was
acting in an ex officio capacity,"3 2 but where a certain officer is
specified as being removable, that will not include all officers performing similar functions." 3 The courts have also decided that
4
12
Hyde v. State, (1876) 52 Miss. 665.
12
5State
Prison of N. C. v. Day, (1899) 124 N. C. 362, 32 S. E. 748.
126Opinion of Justices, (1881) 72 Me. 542.
2Opinion of the Justices, (1926) 125 Me. 529, 133 At. 265.
12sState
ex rel. Ulrick v. Sanchez, (1927) 32 N. M. 265, 255 Pac. 1077.
29

1 People ex rel. Travers v. Freese, (1888) 76 Cal. 633, 18 Pac. 812.

"3OLane v. Commonwealth, ex rel. Attorney General, (1883) 103 Pa.
St. 481.
13XCommonwealth ex rel. Attorney General v. Benn, (1925) 284 Pa.
St. 421, 131 Atl. 253; Commonwealth ex rel. v. Stewart, (1926) 286 Pa. St.
511, 134 At. 392.
'32Attorney General v. Jochim, (1894) 99 Mich. 358, 58 N. W. 611.
133Henry v. State ex rel. Coody, (1922) 130 Miss. 855, 95 So. 67.
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the reasons for removal must have occurred during the term of
the officer being removed, 13' and that they must relate to the office
itself, and not simply to the conduct of the officer as a private individual.'3 5 One court adds that the first part of this rule applies
only to finished offenses which are known and have been condoned
by election-or appointment, but does not apply to a situation where
there is neglect of a continuing duty (such as to prosecute a case)
during a current term when the officer should be discharging the
36
duties of the office.
Closely akin to the power of removal is the power of suspension. Some courts have held that this power is included in the
power to remove, 13 but in at least one state the decision has been
opposite. 13 There is, however, a surprising unanimity of opinio6i
that where the governor does have the power of suspension there
is no necessity for him giving a notice and hearing.133 The fact
of suspension alone does not render the officer ineligible for selection for a succeeding term.140 There are, in addition to these decisions several made by the Florida court, which are interesting,
but which do not lay down general rules, because they are interpreting a very special provision found only in the Florida constitution.141

One question which we have seen arising both in the cases
of appointment and suspension has been that of the implying of
these powers if they are not specifically granted. The same problem arises in relation to the power of removal. The generalization found in most American Government text-books is that while
the President's power of removal is implied, this is not so in
most states with regard to the governor. Dictum in some states
34
1 In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, (1914) 67 Fla. 489, 65
So. 224. But compare State ex relh Douglas v. Megaarden, (1901) 85
Minn.41, 93, 88 N. W. 412, 413.
135State ex rel. Martin v. Burnquist, (1918) 141 Min. 308, 170 N. W.
201. 36
' 37 State v. Allen, (Fla. 1937) 172 So. 222.
1 State ex rel. Clapp v. Peterson, (1892) 50 Minn. 239, 52 N. W. 655;
Martin v. County of Dodge, (1920) 146 Minn. 129, 178 N. W. 167; State ex
inf. Shartel v. Brunk, (1930) 326 Mo. 1181, 34 S.XV. (2d) 94.
13SCull v. Wheltle, (1910)

114 lid. 58, 78 At!. 820.
I-Martin v. County of Dodge, (1920) 146 Minn. 129, 178 N.

W. 167;
Gray v. McLendon, (1910) 134 Ga. 224, 67 S.E. 859; State ex rel.
Attorney
General v. Johnson, (1892) 30 Fla. 433, 11 So. 845.
I4OIn re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, (1893)
31 Fla. 1, 12 So.
114. Compare State ex rel. Childs v. Dart, (1894) 57 Minn. 261, 263, 59
N. W. 190 (ineligible to reappointment ad interim to remainder of term).
"4'Advisory Opinion to the Governor, (1915) 69 Fla. 508. 108 So. 450;
State ex rel. Jackson v. Crawford, (1918) 76 Fla. 388, 79 So. 875.
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has been contra. 142 An old rule, followed by many courts, is that
when the tenure of office is not fixed by law, and is thus indefinite, the power of removal is incidental to the power of appointment.1 43 In the case of a holdover in office after the expiration
of his term the court has decided that inasmuch as a holdover is
only a locum tenens, the governor can remove him,

44

the removal

in this case having been accomplished by the appointment of a
successor. In other states, however, the doctrine that removal is
not incidental to the power of appointment has been laid down. 1 4
There is greater unanimity where other sources of constitutional implication have been attempted, the courts holding that
the removal power will not be implied from the separation of
powers clause,'" the grant of the chief executive power to the
governor,14 7 the obligation to see that the laws of the state shall
be faithfully executed'

48

the power to require information from

inferior officers, 149 or the power to fill a vacancy. 1 0 In fact, there
are certain other grants of power that show a definite intention
not to give the governor a removal power, such as granting it to
specified officers.'
142 Opinion of Justices, (1881) 72 Me. 542; Cameron v. Parker, (1894)
2 Okla. 277, 38 Pac. 14. But compare cases and language cited in Jennings,
Removal from Public Office in Minnesota, (1936) 20 MINNEso'rA LAW
REVIEW 721, 736, note 70.
14Commonwealth ex rel. Lehman v. Sutherland, (1817) 3 Serg. and
Rawle (Pa.) 145; Halder v. Anderson, (1925) 160 Ga. 433, 128 S. E.
181; Keenan v. Perry, (1859) 24 Tex. 253; Cole v. Territory ex rel. Wilson,
(1897) 5 Ariz. 137, 48 Pac. 217; State ex rel. Nagle v. Sullivan, (1935)
98 Mont. 425, 40 P. (2d) 995. In Sykes v. City of Minneapolis, (1913) 124
Minn. 73, 144 N. W. 453, the same rule was applied to an office with a fixed
term. See Jennings, Removal from Public Office in Minnesota, (1936) 20
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 721, 736, note 68.
'44State ex rel. Withers v. Stonestreet, (1889) 99 Mo. 361, 12 S. W. 895.
'"5State ex rel. Lyon v. Rhame, (1912) 92 S. C. 455, 75 S. E. 881;
Votteler v. Fields, (1926) 232 Ky. 322, 23 S. W. (2d) 588: Dubuc v.
Voss, (1867) 19 La. Ann. 210; Field v. The People ex rel. McClernand,
(1839) 3 Ili. 79; Johnson v. Laffoon, (1935) 257 Ky. 156, 77 S. W. (2d)
345.
'46Field
v. The People ex rel. McClernand, (1839) 3 Il1. 79.
147 Bruce v. Mattock, (1908) 86 Ark. 555, 111 S. W. 990; Halder v.
Anderson, (1925) 160 Ga. 433, 128 S. E. 181; Field v. The People ex rel.
McClernand, (1839) 3 Ill. 79; State ex rel. Lyon v. Rhame, (1912) 92
S. C. 455, 75 S. E. 881; State ex rel. Huckabee v. Hough, (1915) 108 S. C.
87, 87 S. E. 436; State ex rel. Weke v. Frazier, (1921) 47 N. D. 314, 182
N. W. 545; Johnson v. Laffoon, (1935) 257 Ky. 156, 77 S. W. (2d) 345.
4
6Field v. The People ex rel. McClernand, (1839) 3 Il1. 79; Halder
v. Anderson, (1925) 160 Ga. 433, 128 S. E. 181.
49
1 Field v. The People ex rel. McClernand, (1839) 3 Ill. 79.
15oPage v. Hardin, (1846) 8 B. Mon. (Ky.) 648; Votteler v. Fields,
(1926) 232 Ky. 322, 23 S. W. (2d) 588.
' 9 'State ex rel. Lyon v. Rhame, (1912) 92 S. C. 455, 75 S. E. 881;
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When the governor does have the removal power, to whom is
it applicable? Where the constitution provides that he can remove
those officers whom he can appoint, the courts have given it a
wide interpretation, and have included officers in whose appointment the governor had a part, whether senate consent was or was
152not necessary for the appointment.
Where the constitution allows the legislature to provide the
manner of removal for certain specified offenses, the legislature
cannot empower the governor to make removals for other causes. 3
The constitutional recital is exclusive. A similar doctrine is that
where the constitution lists the reasons for which an officer can
be impeached, and places the sole power of impeachment in the
legislature, the legislature cannot give the governor the removal
power over that officer.1 "'
Occasionally a question arises concerning the intent of the governor to make a removal. Where the governor had an unrestricted
removal power and appointed a new man to the position already
filled, the commission reading "vice John Abbott" (the incumbent), the court held it a good removal."" This is true even where
the removal power is implied, and the term of the office is not
fixed.15 6 Where the court's interpretation of a holdover provision
is that it does not fill a vacancy, the filling of the vacancy by the
governor will automatically remove the holdover 5 T but where
the interpretation is that the holdover fills the vacancy the governor does not have the appointing power, and therefore cannot
remove b this method."" There is some authority that if it is
obvious that the governor does not intend his appointments to act
as removals they will not be so construed.""'
McDowell v. Burnett, (1912) 92 S. C. 469, 75 S. E. 873; State ex rel.

Huckabee v. Hough, (1915) 108 S. C. 87, 87 S. E. 436.
1S2Wilcox v. People ex rel. Lipe, (1878) 90 Ill. 186; Harman v.
Harwood,
(1881) 58 Md. 1.
153State ex rel. Holmes v. Shannon, (1895) 7 S. D. 319, 64 N. W.

175; Bowman's Case, (1909)
Removal from Public Office
vIEw 721, 735-736, note 68,
the Minnesota constitution.

225 Pa. St. 364, 74 Ati. 203. But see Jennings,

in Minnesota, (1936) 20 MiNNSsoTA LAw Rr-

as to the interpretation of art. 13, sec. 2 of
See also Mason's 192-7 Minn. Stat., sec. 6954, a

very 54
common type of statute.
1 State eX inf. Shartel v. Brunk, (1930)

326 Mo. 1181, 34 S. W.
(2d) 5594.
1 State and Di Carlo v. Abbott, (1889) 41 La. Ann. 1096, 6 So. 805.
'56Keenan
v. Perry, (1859) 24 Tex. 253.
' 57State ex rel. Withers v. Stonestreet, (1889) 99 Mo. 361, 12 S. W. 895.
15SPeople
ex rel. Andrews v. Lord, (1861) 9 Mich. 227.
159Territorial Board of Education v. Territory of Oklahoma ex rel.
Taylor, (1902) 12 Okla. 286, 70 Pac. 792.
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Where the removed officer refuses to surrender his office, at
least one court has held that the governor cannot have him physically thrown out, but the man in possession of the office is entitled
to equitable interference to prevent forcible disturbance except as
a result of judicial proceedings.1 06 And where a suspended officer
resigns during removal proceedings, it has been held that lie cannot be immediately reappointed, for that would nullify the
removal procedure.""
The "due process" clause involves legal doctrines that may
affect the removal power. The concept of an office as a form of
property has undergone a great change. Originally considered
as being a property right, the development has gone all the way
to the other extreme in some courts, to the doctrine that an office
"
is in no way property within the meaning of this clause. " It
would seem that the best doctrine is that enunciated by the Wisconsin court that an office does have a pecuniary value, and that
therefore, while there is no tangible property, there is some ele0
ment which will be protected under the due process clause.
The result will be that the person being removed will be entitled
to a notification of the charges for which he is being removed,
04
time to prepare an answer, and a hearing.
Aside from this doctrine, there is authority that where the
removal can be made by the governor for cause, but the causes
This
are not specified, notice and hearing are not necessary."'
the
constitumay be true even when the causes are specified in
The power of summary removal is likewise
tion or statute.'
Some implipresent where the tenure of the officer is not fixed.'
'6 OEkern v. McGovern, (1913) 154 Wis. 157, 142 N. W. 595.
16State ex tel. Childs v. Dart, (1894) 57 Minn. 261, 59 N. W. 190.
1G2Attorney General v. Jochim, (1894) 99 Mich. 358, 58 N. W. 611;
Gray v. McLendon, (1910) 134 Ga. 224, 67 S. E. 859; State ex inf. Attorney
General v. Hedrick, (1922) 294 Mo. 21, 241 S. W. 402; State ex rel.
Attorney General v. Hawkins, (1886) 44 Ohio St. 98, 5 N. E. 228.
163 State ex rel. Rodd v. Verage, (1922) 177 Wis. 295, 187 N. W. 830;
Ekern v. McGovern, (1913) 154 Wis. 157, 142 N. W. 595; Fugate v.
Weston, (1931) 156 Va. 107, 157 S. E. 736. And see Jennings, Removal
from Public Office in Minnesota, '(1936) 20 MiNNESOTA LAw RFViEW
724-725, 727-728.
164Ekern v. McGovern, (1913) 154 Wis. 157, 142 N. W. 595; Fugate
v. Weston, (1931) 156 Va. 107, 157 S. E. 736.
165Trimble v. The People, (1893) 19 Colo. 187, 34 Pac. 981; Conklin
v. Cunningham, (1894) 7 N. M. 445, 38 Pac. 170.
16Keenan v. Perry, (1859) 24 Tex. 253.
lGTKeenan v. Perry, (1859) 24 Tex. 253; State ex inf. Barker v.
Crandall, (1916) 269 Mo. 44, 190 S. W. 889.
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cation can be drawn from ihe fact that a constitutional provision
does not mention the necessity for notice and hearing."'
There is authority contra to the rules set down immediately
above. The Colorado court has held there was a necessity for
notice and hearing when the causes for removal were specified,"
When the tenure of office is fixed, the general rule is that the
incumbent cannot be summarily removed. 70 And some courts
have decided that notice and hearing are necessary unless the constitution manifestly intends otherwise. The mere omission of the
requirement is not sufficient manifestation of intent."'
In order to determine who may execute the removal power,
it is sometimes necessary to decide what kind of power it is. One
answer is that it is judicial in nature because of the action involved
in the process. 7 2 This decision does not, however, prevent the
legislature from granting the power to the governor.' 73 The Virginia court adds that unless there is a power of review in the
courts the governor has been given a judicial function.'"
Other courts classify the removing power as hybrid, quasi- or
semi-judicial. 1 75 The effect of this decision seems to be similar
to that of the doctrine that the power is judicial. And, finally,
there are those courts that hold the power of removal to be essentially executive in nature,'7 in which case, of course, there is no
doubt as to the legislature's power to give it to the governor if
he does not already have it.
Closely related to all these angles of the removal power is the
losState ex rel. Ulrick v. Sanchez, (1927) 32 N. M. 265, 255 Pac.
1077; State ex rel. Holland v. Ledwith, (1872) 14 Fla. 220; State ex rel.
Hatton9 v. Joughin, (1931) 103 Fla. 877, 138 So. 392.
16 Benson v. People ex reL. McClelland, (1897) 10 Colo. App. 175, 50
Pac. 212; See also State ex rel. McReany v. Burke, (1894) 8 Wash. 412, 36
Pac. 281.
'777°Lease v. Freeborn, (1894) 52 Kans. 750, 35 Pac. 817.
' 72 Dullam v. Willson, (1894) 53 Mich. 392, 19 N. W. 112.
State v. Pritchard, (1873) 36 N. J. L. 101; State em rel. Kinsella
v. Eberhart, (1911) 116 Minn. 313, 133 N. W. 857; Randall v. The State,
(1863)7 3 16 Wis. 340; Du~lam v. Willson, (1894) 53 Mich. 392, 19 N. W. 112.
' South v. Commissioners of Sinking Fund, (1887) 86 Ky. 186, 5
S. V. 567; McCran v. Gaul, (1920) 95 N. J. L. 393, 112 At. 341.
'--Fugate v. Weston, (1931) 156 Va. 107, 157 S. E. 736.
"--Ekern v. McGovern, (1913) 154 Wis. 157, 142 N. W. 595; Germaine
v. Governor, (1913) 176 Mich. 585, 142 N. W. 738; State ex rel. Weke
v. Frazier,
(1921) 47 N. D. 314, 182 N. W. 545.
' 76 State ex inf. Attorney General v. Hedrick, (1922) -94 Mo. 21, 241
S. V. 402; In the matter of Guden, (1902) 171 N. Y. 529, 64 N. E. 451;
Cameron v. Parker, (1894) 2 Okla. 277, 38 Pac. 14; Johnson v. Laffoon.
(1935) 257 Ky. 156, 77 S. W. (2d) 345; State ex rel. Matson v. O'Hern,
(Mont. 1937) 65 P. (2d) 619.
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question of the power of the courts to review the governor's action.
Several judges have held that where the power is to remove for
cause, without the causes being specified, the governor's power is
exclusive and the courts cannot review his actions.17 7 The same
result has occurred even when the causes of removal are specified.1 71
Likewise, where the case is brought against the governor,
and the court decides that it cannot issue an order against the
governor, the governor's actions cannot be reviewed, though they
can be reviewed if the case is between two individuals where one
of them asserts some rights by virtue of some executive action.' 78
These decisions have all involved statutory clauses, but the cases
concerning constitutional clauses are in accord.18 0 An additional
doctrine is that as to the question of the presence of jurisdictional facts the court does have the power of review, as it has
also as to their sufficiency, though it cannot review the sufficiency
of the evidence that supports these facts.""'
An examination of the various constitutional provisions and
judicial decisions which have been described shows that the governor of a state is not a chief executive to the same extent that
the president of the United States is a chief executive. It is
true that the governor is generally given this description in the
state constitution, but a comparison of the extent of his powers
of appointment and removal with the extent of those of the
president shows conclusively his more restricted position.
In the first place, the constitutional and statutory provisions
themselves do not give to the governor the appointing and remnov177Trimble v. The People, (1893) 19 Colo. 187, 34 Pac. 981; Gray v.
McLendon, (1910) 134 Ga. 224, 67 S. E. 859; State ex inf. Barker v.
Crandall,
(1916) 269 Mo. 44, 190 S. W. 889.
l 7sState ex rel. Attorney General v. Lamantia, (1881) 33 La. Ann. 446;
State and Di Carlo v. Abbott, (1889) 41 La. Ann. 1096, 6 So. 805; Bynnm
v. Strain,
(1923) 95 Okla. 45, 218 Pac. 883.
17 9Germaine v. Governor, (1913) 176 Mich. 585, 142 N. W. 738;
State80ex rel. Rawlinson v. Ansel, (1906) 76 S. C. 395, 57 S. E. 185.
State ex rel. Holland v. Ledwith, (1872) 14 Fla. 220; In the
matter of Guden, (1902) 171 N. Y. 529, 64 N. E. 451; Wilcox v. People
ex rel. Lipe, (1878) 90 Ill. 186; State ex rel. Ulrick v. Sanchez, (1927)
32 N. M. 265, 255 Pac. 1077.
'sState ex rel. Bridges v. Henry, (1910) 60 Fla. 246, 53 So. 742;
State ex rel. Hatton v. Joughin, (1931) 103 Fla. 877, 138 So. 392: State
ex rel. Hardie v. Coleman, (1934) 115 Fla. 119, 155 So. 129. See
annotation of this last case in 92 A. L. R. 989; State ex rel. Attorney
General v. Hawkins, (1886) 44 Ohio St. 98, 5 N. E. 228; Ekern v.
McGovern, (1913) 154 Wis. 157, 142 N. W. 595; State ex rel. Churchill
v. Hay, (1895) 45 Neb. 321, 63 N. W. 821; People ex rel. Johnson v. Coffey.
(1927) 237 Mich. 591, 213 N. W. 460; State ex rel. Kinsella v. Eberhart.
(1911) 116 Minn. 313, 133 N. W. 857.
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ing power that the president enjoys. The president is given
the power to appoint all officers, by and with the advice and
consent of the senate, with the exception of the so-called "inferior" officers.1 2 No governor has so extensive a power.
So far as explicit constitutional provisions for the removal
of officers are concerned, the governors seem to have been given
more power than the president, for the United States constitution gives to the latter no specific removal power at all, but some
state constitutions do give the power of removal, generally for
certain specified causes, to the governor. However, this seeming
disparity of powers between the president and the governors has
been reversed as a result of judicial decisions.
Court decisions, both in the case of appointment and removal,
have tended to enlarge the powers of the president and to restrict
those of the governors. Many examples of this narrow construction of the governor's appointing power have been examined in
this study, and a few of them may be mentioned. The interpretation of the holdover provision, decisions as to the length of the
term of the governor's appointee to fill a vacancy, and the refusals
to allow the governor to make appointments when an officer dies
shortly before an election show this tendency in the case of the
appointing power.
It is not fair to leave this assertion without modifying it by
shoving that there have also been decisions which extend the
governor's power. The minority doctrine that appointment is
executive by nature, the interpretation of the word "vacancy" in
relation to newly created offices, and some decisions on the power
of the governor to appoint individuals whom the senate has
rejected show some liberality toward the governor's appointing
power by the courts.
In the case of the removal power, the United States courts
and the state "courts have traveled in opposite directions. Despite
the fact that the United States constitution gives to the president
no power to remove officers, the supreme court has decided that
a very extensive removal power can be implied,"8" and is beyond
legislative curtailment, though this latter has been somewhat modified by a more recent decision.18' But a majority of the state
ls2United States, constitution, art. II, sec. 2, cdause 2.
'S3Myers v. United States, (1926) 272 U. S. 52, 47 Sup. Ct. 21, 71 L.
Ed. 160.
4
IS Humphrey's Executor

(Rathbun)

U: S.602, 55 Sup. Ct. 869, 79 L. Ed. 1611.

v. United States,

(1935)
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courts has decided just the opposite, holding that the power of
removal cannot be implied from any of the elements depended
on by the United States supreme court. In addition, when a
state constitution has granted the power of removal to the governor, the court of that state has generally given the provision
a very strict construction. But here, too, there are exceptions to
this genralization, as in the decisions concerning the power of
suspension, and the power of the courts to review the actions of
the governor.
Although this is primarily a study of the constitutional power
of the governor, it is advisable to call attention to the effects of
statutes on the conclusions which have been reached. The general
result of the statutes concerning appointment and removal has
been to extend the powers of the governor. Many of the reorganizations of state governments which have taken place during
the past few years have been brought about by statute, and one
common feature of these statutes has been a greatly increased
centralization of authority in the governor. This has meant giving
him larger and more extensive powers of appointment and removal.
The courts do not find so much difficulty in broadening statutory
rules as they do in broadening constitutional provisions, and it is
probably through the former that a further extension of the governor's powers will come.
Finally, the manner in which the growth of the governor's
position is mirrored in the development of his powers of appointment and removal is interesting. As can be seen from the dates
of the cases, many of the decisions which have been discussed were
rendered during the period when the general policy was to restrict
the powers of that office. But the newer constitutions and the
later decisions show a tendency to extend the powers of the governor. Judicial construction of these powers is still strict, but
it is less strict than formerly, and this tendency, together with
those of the constitution and statute makers will probably result
in the governor becoming more truly a chief executive than he
has been in the past.

